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Selecting Presuppositions in
Conditional Clauses. Results from a
Psycholinguistic Experiment
Filippo Domaneschi, Elena Carrea, Carlo Penco* and Alberto Greco
University of Genoa, Genoa, Italy
In this paper, we propose an experiment concerning presupposition selection in
conditional sentences containing a presupposition trigger in the consequent. Many
theories claim that sentences like if p, qq’—where q is the presupposition of the assertive
component q’—have unconditional presuppositions, namely, they simply project q.
Other theories suggest that these kinds of conditional sentences project conditional
presuppositions of the form if p, q. Data collected suggest two results: (i) in accordance
with other experiments (by Romoli), dependence between the presupposition q and the
antecedent p favors the selection of a conditional presupposition if p, q. (ii) presupposition
selection in conditional sentences with a trigger in the consequent is affected by
speakers’ cognitive load: if speakers are highly cognitive loaded, then they are less
disposed to select a conditional presupposition. We conclude by arguing that cognitive
load represents a key factor for the analysis of linguistic and philosophical theories of
context.
Keywords: presuppositions, conditional clauses, update semantics, context change potential, cognitive load
PRESUPPOSITIONS, CONTEXT SET, AND COMPOSITIONALITY
According to the standard semantic framework, the common ground is the set of propositions that
participants in a conversation mutually assume to be taken for granted (Stalnaker, 2002). In this
view, the common ground determines the context set, that is, the set of possible worlds in which all
the propositions that form the common ground are true (Heim, 1983, 1992).
According to this standpoint, the meaning of a sentence is modeled via its context change
potential (CCP): an instruction to update the context with new information with the effect of
producing a new updated context as result. For instance, if the context c corresponds to the set
of possible worlds in which “I have a sister,” “Konstanz is in Europe,” and “Today is Monday” and,
in this context, a speaker utters the sentence “I’ve bought a new car” (φ), then the assertion of this
sentence in the context c (i.e., c+φ) produces, as a result, a context c’ that corresponds to the set of
possible worlds in which “I have a sister,” “Konstanz is in Europe,” “Today is Monday,” and “I’ve
bought a new car.”
From this perspective, presuppositions put requirements on the context: ifψ is a presupposition
of φ, then c + φ is defined only if c ⊆ ψ. For example, the sentence “My car is red” can only
be uttered in contexts that entail the presupposition “I have a (unique) car.” A sentence’s CCP,
therefore, is the extent to which the sentence changes the context in which it is uttered to produce a
new context, assuming that the new context accepts as true not only the sentence itself but also the
presupposition of the uttered sentence. In general, CCP may be defined as a partial function from
Domaneschi et al. Selecting Presuppositions
contexts to contexts: a sentence φ can only be uttered in a given
class of contexts and brings about a new class of contexts as
result1.
In order to provide an explanation of how the context changes
in the course of a conversation, different dynamic semantic
theories have proposed formal representations of language
structure aimed at modeling the growth of information in
the processing and development of a discourse. Overall, this
aims to provide a solution to the traditional problem of the
compositionality of meaning, that is, an explanation of how the
meaning of compound sentences depends systematically on the
meaning of their constituents and on the logical operators in use
(e.g., negation ¬φ, conjunctions φ ∧ ϕ, disjunctions φ ∨ ϕ, and
conditionals φ→ ϕ).
In this respect, for many years, linguists and philosophers
have been interested in the so-called “presupposition projection
problem” (Heim, 1983, 1992; Geurts, 1999; Beaver, 2001;
Schlenker, 2008, 2009; Singh, 2008; Kripke, 2009), that is,
the problem of the compositionality of presuppositions, how
complex sentences inherit their parts’ presuppositions. This
paper deals in particular with one of the most-discussed topics
in this field of research: the Proviso Problem, the problem
of the projection properties of conditional sentences with a
presupposition trigger in the consequent.
THE PROVISO PROBLEM
The Problem concerns the projection properties of a specific
case of composed clauses, conditional sentences that contain a
presupposition trigger2 in the consequent (CpC); schematically,
if p, qq’ (where q is a presupposition triggered by the assertive
component q’). This core problem, the Proviso Problem (Geurts,
1996), has been widely discussed in recent literature (see for
instance, Beaver, 2001; Singh, 2008; von Fintel, 2008; Schlenker,
2010; Chemla and Schlenker, 2011). The discussion has generated
two different kinds of answers.
On the one hand, several theories—mainly taking Discourse
Representation Theory (DRT) as a framework—claim that
sentences of the type if p, qq’ have mainly unconditional
presuppositions, namely, they simply project q (e.g., Gazdar,
1979; van der Sandt, 1992; Geurts, 1999). It is, in fact, intuitive
that, in several cases, the presupposition projected by a CpC
is unconditional; for instance, it is the case in the following
utterance (quoted in Geurts, 1999).
(1) If John hates sonnets then his wife does so, too.
1To be precise, a sentence is only ever uttered in a particular context, but the same
sentence can be correctly used in all contexts in which its presuppositions are true
(we are grateful to a referee of Frontiers for making this distinction).
2Presupposition triggers are lexical items and syntactic constructions that, if used
in an utterance, activate a presupposition. In contemporary debate, there are
two major approaches to the problem of triggering presuppositions. In semantic
approaches, it is claimed that presuppositions are a particular type of meaning
determined by the lexicon (Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet, 2000; Simons, 2001).
Other scholars (Karttunen, 1974; Simons, 2001; Abusch, 2010; Schlenker, 2010)
have supported a pragmatic view, according to which presuppositions are the result
of speakers’ inferences, as well as conversational implicatures (Abusch, 2002, 2010).
On more specific relations between presuppositions and scalar implicatures see
Pistoia Reda (2014).
(1a). John has a wife
(1) projects the unconditional presupposition, (1a). These
theories do not exclude the possibility of deriving a conditional
entailments, of the form if p, q, but they claim that the
unconditional presupposition is the default reading, since it is
the result of the universal preferencing of global over local
accommodation. This is because, while the unconditional reading
is derived as a presupposition, the conditional reading is inferred
as an entailment. In other words, a sentence of the form if p,
qq’ can be represented in at least two ways in terms of discourse
structure.
- In the first reading, the presupposition q is globally resolved,
that is, it is not represented in the utterance structure but in the
global discourse structure, and the result is q and if p, then q’
which captures the unconditional presupposition q.
- In the second reading, q is locally represented and the result is
If p, then q and q’, which entails the conditional sentence if p,
then q3.
In the latter view, the local resolution of the presupposition is
supposed to be possible only in contexts where it is supported by
a “bridging inference” of the form if p then it’s usual that q based
on world knowledge (Geurts, 1999; Piwek and Krahmer, 2000).
For example, the local resolution that leads to the conditional
entailment (2a) in the case of the sentence (2) is allowed by the
bridging inference, “If Mark is a Professor, then it’s usual that he
has students.”
(2) If Mark is a Professor, then his students love him.
(2a). If Mark is a Professor, then he has students.
On the other hand, competing theories, traditionally known
as “satisfaction theories,” whose subscribers are often also
supporters of dynamics semantics4, predict that CpC always
project conditional presuppositions of the form if p, q and derive
the unconditional presupposition in different ways depending on
the versions of the theory (e.g., Heim, 1983; Beaver, 2001; Singh,
2007; van Rooij, 2007; Chemla, 2009). A seminal idea proposed
by Heim (1983) has been developed within the framework of
update semantics: when a context c does not satisfy or does not
admit an assertion of if p, then qq’, the repair of the context
is driven by the instruction c[if p, then q][if p, then qq’]. For
example, informally, to update the context cwith the information
conveyed by (2), it is first necessary to update the context set with
the information (2a).
Let us now consider the following examples (quoted in Pérez-
Carballo, 2009).
(3) If Paul is not tired, then he will read his Bible tonight.
(3a). If Paul is not tired, then he has a Bible.
3See van der Sandt (1992) for the seminal idea of the resolution of presuppositions
in DRT.
4Recently, Schlenker (2008; 2009) has proposed a more static approach that makes
the same predictions as dynamic semantics with regards to the Proviso Problem.
Schlenker (2008), for instance, proposes an account of presupposition projection
within a classic semantic framework enriched with two pragmatic principles
grounded on the Gricean maxim of manner: “Be articulated” and “Be brief.”
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(3b). Paul has a Bible.
(4) If Paul is a devout Catholic, then he will read his Bible
tonight.
(4a). If Paul is a devout Catholic, then he has a Bible.
(4b). Paul has a Bible.
As pointed out by Pérez-Carballo (2009), intuitively, (3)
seems to project the unconditional presupposition (3b), while
(4) seems to project the conditional presupposition (4a). A
possible explanation for that diversity is that, since “the only
difference between the two examples is the antecedent clause,
the antecedent clause must play an important role in the present
phenomenon” (Romoli et al., 2011; p. 593). In particular, the
dependence of the antecedent on the presupposition of the
consequent seems to play a crucial role in the Proviso Problem5.
This dependence seems specifically to affect the selection
of conditional and unconditional presuppositions, which is
traditionally identified by Singh (2007, 2008) and Schlenker
(2011, p. 2) as the “Selection Problem.” This problem needs to
be distinguished from the “Strengthening Problem,” that is, the
question of which mechanisms generate these presuppositions.
In what follows, we focus on the Selection Problem,
with a view to grasping whether and when conditional and
unconditional presuppositions are selected depending on the
relation between the antecedent and the consequent of CpC,
specifically, depending on the bridging relation between the
presupposition of the consequent and the antecedent of the
conditional. In the last decade, the presupposition projection
problem has been the subject of several experimental studies
but, to our knowledge, no work has been directly aimed at
evaluating the relationship between presupposition projection
and working memory. Our central goal, besides the confirmation
or disconfirmation of previous experimental results, is to study
the cognitive load factor in relation to the presupposition
selection in CpC. The importance of this aspect in the
experimental investigations of ordinary language is due to the
widely accepted idea that the greater the extent to which people are
cognitively loaded, the greater their difficulty in processing certain
information. Work on the relationship between cognitive load
and conditional reasoning or processing conditional sentences
has already produced interesting results, such as Toms et al.
(1993), Markovits et al. (2002), Meiser et al. (2001), Capon et al.
(2003). Our experiment uses this basic idea, generating different
levels of cognitive load to assess whether this affects the subject’s
understanding or grasping of a conditional or unconditional
presupposition in CpC. We might say, therefore, that the
general question at stake here concerns the compositionality
of presuppositions: what factors affect the selection of either a
composed or a simple presupposition?
AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
The aim of this experimental study is to test three hypotheses
about presupposition selection in CpC. The first two hypotheses
5The idea that this kind of probabilistic reasoning is relevant to the Proviso
Problem is discussed in Beaver (2001); Lassiter (2012), Schlenker (2011), and von
Fintel (2008).
have been already investigated by Romoli et al. (2011), although,
here, we propose a different experimental design, which is also
required to test the third hypotheses.
(i) The conditional presupposition if p, q is selected more
frequently than the unconditional presupposition q.
(ii) The conditional presupposition If p, q is more likely to arise
when the presupposition q in the consequent is dependent
on the antecedent p.
(iii) Speakers’ cognitive load affects the selection of the
presupposition (conditional or unconditional).
Our experiment has been designed to measure the frequency
of selection of conditional and unconditional presuppositions.
The preponderance of either conditional or unconditional
presuppositions, however, does not directly constitute something
that can decide between the two approaches: DRT vs. satisfaction
theories. In fact, the two approaches each predict that both
conditional and unconditional presuppositions can arise and
neither concerns itself directly with predicting the frequency
of each kind of presuppositions. For one approach, the default
reading is the conditional presupposition, for the other, the
unconditional. The main purpose of this paper, therefore, is
to take a first step toward a better understanding of the main
factors that affect the frequency of conditional vs. unconditional
presuppositions.
In the experiment, participants were required to perform two
tasks simultaneously. The main task consisted of listening to a
short recording, containing sentences of the type if p, qq’ and,
after that, choosing one sentence that best fits with the recording,
from a list of four alternatives. The second task, included in Trials
1 and 3 of the experiment, was to remember two geometrical
Figures during the first part of the main task (listening to the
recordings). Trials 1 and 3 included the Interference condition,
while Trials 2 and 4 included the Simple condition, without
interference in the main task.
Pre-experiment
Two kinds of target items (sentences of the form p, qq’) were
needed for the experiment: Dependent items, in which the
presupposition q in the consequent was strongly related to the
antecedent content p, and Independent items, in which there was
no dependence between p and q. In order to select appropriate
items, a questionnaire was created (completed by pencil and
paper) similar to the one used by Romoli et al. (2011).
The participants in the pre-experiment were 23 students
(15 women, 8 men) from the University of Genoa. They were
recruited for course credit. Their ages ranged between 21 and 32
(M = 23.95; SD = 3.27). All participants were native Italian
speakers. Informed consent was obtained.
In the questionnaire, sentences, each followed by a question,
were presented to participants; for instance, “Lucy has a dog.
Does that make it more likely that she has a leash?” The task was
to give an assessment on a 5-point Likert scale, from 1 (much less
likely) to 5 (much more likely). The questionnaire included 39
items. The five items—four tests, plus one instruction trial—with
the highest score were chosen as target Dependent items, while
the five items with the scores closest to the neutral 2.5 point were
chosen as target Independent items.
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Participants in the Main Experiment
Participants in themain experiment were 30 students (14 women,
16 men) from the University of Genoa. None had previously
taken part in the pre-experiment. They were recruited for course
credit. Their ages ranged between 20 and 31 (M = 25.8; SD =
2.94). All participants were native speakers of Italian. Informed
consent was obtained.
Stimuli
We created 5 recordings concerning fictional crimes6. Every
sentence of each recording was read by different female and
male voices. We used a whodunit subject in order to encourage
participants to be more attentive to details, as if they were
detectives7. The sentences that constituted the stories were in fact
seemingly unrelated and participants had to interpret them as
clues to be collected and interpreted, as if they were detectives.
Each recording comprised between 51 and 66 words (an average
of 58). Three conditional sentences, with balanced order, were
included in each recording: (i) a Dependent target conditional
sentence, (ii) an Independent target conditional sentence, (iii)
a distractor conditional sentence. Dependent and Independent
target sentences were selected on the basis of the results obtained
in the pre-experiment. All the target conditional sentences
activated a presupposition in the consequent via the presence of a
definite description. For instance, the Recording 1 ran as follows.
The thief came into the house during the night. Luke’s father is
the owner of the house. If Luke is a writer, then his book is sold
at the bookshop [Dependent target]. Mud stains were found on
the carpet in the living room. If the thief came into the house
passing through the garden, then he should have left footprints
[distractor]. If Luke is tall, then he will tell one of his jokes to the
cops [Independent target].
Two sets of four sentences were connected to each recording, a
Dependent set and an Independent one. In each set, there were
included:
- a sentence [C] corresponding to the conditional presupposition
of the target sentence (Dependent or Independent);
- a sentence [U] corresponding to the unconditional
presupposition of the target sentence (Dependent or
Independent);
- a conditional filler sentence reporting wrong or unmentioned
information about general content of the recording [Fc];
- a unconditional filler sentence reporting wrong or
unmentioned information about general content of the
recording [Fu].
6The experiment was run in Italian. The original items have been included in the
Appendix in Supplementary Material.
7The texts of the recordings and some statements presented incongruous
information mainly because the independent conditionals (see below) expressed
a link between disconnected, independent contents. In order to make these
incongruities plausible to the participants, we required them to act as if they were
detectives, namely, by considering the information presented in the recordings as
disconnected and incoherent clues provided by witnesses. The post-experimental
interview revealed no particular difficulties, on the part of the participants, with
these incongruities.
For example, the Dependent set of sentences related to Recording
1, printed above, was:
- [C] If Luke is a writer, then he has written a book.
- [U] Luke has written a book.
- [Fc] If the house is beautiful, then the thief came into the house
singing.
- [Fu] The thief came into the house singing.
The Independent set included the following four sentences:
- [C] If Luke is tall, then he knows some jokes.
- [U] Luke knows some jokes.
- [Fc] If the thief wore slippers, then he had mud on his pants.
- [Fu] The thief wore slippers.
Sixteen polygons were created (Figure 1) by combining four
shapes—triangle, square, hexagon, circle—with four colors—red,
green, yellow, blue. These figures were used to load participants’
working memory during the execution of the first part of the
main task, namely, listening to recordings.
Procedures
The study was conducted in a laboratory setting. Instructions,
stimuli, response recording, and data collection were controlled
by a laptop computer running E-Prime R© 1.1. Participants sat
approximately 50 cm from the display, in a separate room. The
lighting in the room was normal. Only a keyboard (no mouse)
was available for responses.
The experiment included four trials for each participant. Only
Trials 1 and 3 included the second task about geometrical figures.
Trials 1 and 3 represented therefore the Interference condition,
while Trials 2 and 4 represented the Simple condition, without
interference.
The Interference condition trials consisted of the following
phases (Figure 2A).
1. Two geometrical figures were shown on the screen for 6 s.
2. Participants listened to an audio recording. This phase lasted
29 s.
FIGURE 1 | The sixteen polygons used as stimuli to load participants’
working memory.
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3. Participants were required to indicate which polygons they
had observed during Phase 1. This step was repeated twice:
on the first screen, they indicated the first polygon seen at the
beginning of the task (e.g., blue triangle); the same screen was
then presented for a second time in order to let them indicate
the second polygon (e.g., yellow hexagon).
4. The Dependent set was shown to participants. The task was
to choose one of the four sentences regarding the recordings,
following their intuition. No time limit was introduced but
participants were required to select the sentence as quickly as
possible.
5. Phase 4 was repeated by showing the Independent set.
In the Simple condition, the trials (Figure 2B) included only
Phases 2, 4, and 5.
By way of instruction, the task was explained to participants
by using a sample trial. The trials’ order did not change
during the experiment, while the presentation order of the
Dependent and Independent sets and the presentation order of
the four sentences within each set were randomized for every
participant.
The figures used to load participants’ working memory were
chosen randomly but kept fixed for each trial (e.g., Recording
1 was always presented with a green triangle and a red
hexagon). This was in order to show participants equally difficult
combinations of figures.
Expectations
Our expectations were as follows.
(1) For Romoli et al. (2011), participants were led to select
more conditional presuppositions if p, q, then unconditional
ones, both in case of Dependent target sentences and of
Independent target sentences. In particular, this pattern was
expected for the Simple condition, since it was similar to
Romoli et al.’s design, which did not include any interference
task.
(2) For Romoli et al., the conditional presupposition If p, q
is more likely to arise when the presupposition q in the
consequent is dependent on the antecedent p. Since we used
a within-subject design instead of the between-subject design
adopted by Romoli et al. we aimed to analyze the effect
of the dependence for the very same participant on the
selection of the presupposition, in order to provide a further
confirmation of the dependence hypothesis.
(3) We expected the cognitive load factor might affect
participants’ behavior in the selection of the conditional
presuppositions if p, q in both the Simple and the
Interference conditions. More precisely, since the processing
of conditional sentences seems to depend more on the
resources available in the working memory than the
processing of unconditional (Toms et al., 1993), it is
reasonable to assume that processing and representing
FIGURE 2 | Screenshots of each phase in Interference condition (A) and Simple condition (B) trials.
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a conditional presupposition is likely to be more
cognitively demanding than doing the same for an
unconditional presupposition. Hence our expectation
was that participants would more frequently select an
unconditional presupposition [U] instead of a conditional
one [C] in an interference condition, where they have
limited resources available for processing the conditional
presupposition.
Results
The data from two participants were excluded from the analysis
because of an interruption in task performance. Considering the
second task, with regards to memorizing geometrical figures, the
mean of correct answer was 0.88 (SD = 0.32). Every participant
reached at least 50% of correct answer and thus none of them
were excluded from the analysis.
The general results are reported in Table 1 and graphically
summarized in Figure 3. Considering Expectation 1 above,
we analyzed the percentage of conditional presupposition
selection [C] with respect to the percentage of unconditional
presupposition selection [U] in both conditions. The results were:
• Result 1A: The percentage of conditional presuppositions [C]
was significantly higher than unconditional presupposition
[U], using results for Dependent set plus Independent set in
the Simple condition (Wilcoxon Signed Rank: W = 29.5,
p < 0.001).
• Result 1B: The comparison between [C] and [U], using results
for Dependent set plus Independent set, did not result in a
statistical difference under the Interference condition.
The data seems to be in line with Expectation 1 and those
produced under the Simple condition were consistent with
Romoli et al.’s results.
Considering expectation (2), data collected seemed to
show that:
TABLE 1 | The general results of the experiment under the two conditions
(Interference, Simple) and the two sets of answers (Dependent,
Independent) reported as total frequency of choice.
Dependent set Independent set Total
Interference cond. 60 60 120
C 33 26 59
Fc 1 7 8
Fu 1 6 7
U 25 21 46
Simple cond. 60 60 120
C 48 24 72
Fc 1 4 5
Fu 1 10 11
U 10 22 32
Total 120 120 240
Results concern conditional presuppositions [C], conditional fillers; [Fc], unconditional
fillers; [Fu], unconditional presuppositions [U].
• Result 2A: the percentage of conditional presuppositions [C]
selected in the Dependent set was significantly higher than the
percentage of [C] in the Independent set (Wilcoxon Signed
Rank:W = 6.5, p < 0.001).
• Result 2B: this pattern, in result 2A, did not emerge under the
Interference condition.
Finally, considering Expectation 3, data collected seem to show
that:
• Result 3A: the percentage of [C] selected in the Interference
condition was lower than the same percentage in the Simple
condition with regards to the Dependent set (Wilcoxon Signed
Rank:W = 67, p < 0.05).
• Result 3B: this effect was not observed in the Independent set.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The general goal of this experiment was to investigate the
Selection Problem in presuppositions projection in conditional
sentences with a presupposition trigger in the consequent.
In particular, our experiment was aimed at evaluating the
dependence hypothesis considered by Romoli et al. (2011) and
the role played by participants’ cognitive load.
Data collected showed two results.
(1) Participants, in general, selected the conditional
presuppositions more frequently than the unconditional
presuppositions in processing CpC, as reported in
Result 1A.
This first result is sympathetic to Conclusion (i), proposed by
Romoli et al., according to which conditional presuppositions are
more likely to be selected than unconditional presuppositions.
This conclusion was confirmed by the data we have collected
under the Simple experimental condition8. Therefore, Result 1A
seems to support the central thesis of satisfaction theories that all
CpCs project mainly conditional presuppositions of the form if
p, q.
(2) Participants selected the conditional presuppositions
more frequently when there was dependence between the
antecedent of the CpC and the presupposition activated by
the trigger in the consequent, as reported in Result 2A.
Reconsidering the Simple condition, Result 2A seems to
be compatible both with satisfaction theories and with
theories which predict that CpC mainly project unconditional
presuppositions. In fact, the former theories claim that, in cases
of CpC, conditional presuppositions are selected most of the
time, hence the conditional presupposition If p, q is more likely to
arise when the presupposition q in the consequent is dependent
on the antecedent p. According to the latter theories, even if the
unconditional presupposition is the preferred reading in cases of
CpC, when there is dependence between the antecedent of a CpC
8Since Romoli et al.’s design did not include a second task generating interference,
our Simple condition was more suitable than our Interference condition for
comparison with Romoli et al.’s conclusions.
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FIGURE 3 | The general results graphically summarized in percentages.
and the presupposition triggered in the consequent, speakers are
supposed to select a conditional presupposition.
Result 2A, therefore, coheres with the idea, proposed by
Romoli et al. (2011), that the conditional presupposition If p,
q is more likely to arise when the presupposition q in the
consequent is dependent on the antecedent p. Moreover, since
we used a within-subject design instead of the between-subject
design adopted by Romoli et al., we did not analyze data
collected from different participants assigned to two different
conditions. Rather, we analyzed the effect of dependence, for
the same participant, on the selection of the presupposition,
where dependence was the only manipulated variable. Hence,
this analysis allows us to support a stronger claim: the
dependence between the antecedent and the presupposition in
the consequent of a CpC has a relevant effect in the selection of
the presupposition.
To sum up,Results 1A and 2A support the idea that sentences
of the form If p, qq’ mainly project conditional presupposition as
If p, q and even more so if there is dependence between p and q9.
The second purpose of our experiment was to explore the
effect of participants’ cognitive load. To this end, data collected
seem to suggest that:
(3) the same participant, if highly cognitively loaded, selected
conditional presuppositions less frequently then in the
case of low cognitive load, as occurred under our Simple
condition (see Result 3A).
9As said before, all the target sentences used in our experiment have been divided
into dependent and independent conditionals thanks to the results of the norming
pre-experiment. As pointed out by Romoli et al. further research might address
the question about what notion of dependence has been used by participants while
answering the questionnaire.
Our statistical analysis seems to show that, in the Dependent
set, where participants were supposed to project conditional
presuppositions (as shown by Result 2A), the very same
participant, if highly cognitively loaded, might project an
unconditional presupposition instead of the conditional
presupposition that she probably would have projected if she
had had more cognitive resources available. Considering the
percentages of conditional and unconditional presuppositions
selected within the set of dependent targets, data collected
suggest that, under the Interference condition, the percentage
of conditional presuppositions projected decreases,
while the percentage of unconditional presuppositions
increases.
Result 3A allows us to claim that, to a certain extent,
together with the dependence between the antecedent and
the presupposition in the consequent, speakers’ cognitive
load is a relevant factor that affects the selection of the
presupposition in CpC. One explanation for this result might
be that highly cognitive loaded speakers are less disposed
to select a conditional presupposition since processing the
mental representation corresponding to a composed sentence,
and, in particular, to a conditional sentence, requires more
cognitive effort than is the case for a simple (i.e., unconditional)
sentence. Toms et al. (1993), for example, have argued that
mistakes in conditional reasoning are related to working
memory. In particular, conditional reasoning seems to require
a surplus in working memory that, in turn, requires support
from the central executive. In conditional representations,
the higher the number of models required, the higher the
cognitive effort involved (Barrouillet and Lecas, 1999; Johnson-
Laird, 2001). Hence, the limited available resources under
the Interference condition might have affected the selection
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by changing a conditional answer [C] in an unconditional
answer [U]10.
Some final considerations concern the set of independent
targets in our experiment. First of all, we have shown in
Result 2A that independent conditional presuppositions have
been selected significantly less frequently than dependent
conditional presuppositions under the Simple condition. Thus,
the percentage of independent conditional presuppositions
under the Simple condition was close to the percentage of
unconditional presuppositions. This result might be explained by
assuming that. in the Independent set, since there was no sort of
bridging inference connecting the content of the antecedent and
the content of the consequent of the conditional presupposition
of the CpC, participants have treated independent conditional
presuppositions in the same way, as if they were independent
unconditional presuppositions. In this case, in other words,
the conditional presuppositions have been evaluated as equally
available by the participants so that, in terms of percentage, they
have been equally selected in the course of the experiment.
Secondly, a comparison of Results 2A and 2B shows that
the percentage of conditional presuppositions selected in the
Dependent set decreases from the Simple condition to the
Interference condition, while the percentage of conditional
presuppositions selected in the independent set does not change
significantly from the Simple condition to the Interference
condition. These data seem to support the idea that, while the
cognitive load factor affects the selection of the presuppositions
in the Dependent set, it does not seem to have an effect on
the selection in the Independent set. The data, therefore,
suggest that the cognitive load factor affects the selection of
the presupposition of a CpC only when there is a dependence
between the antecedent of the conditional and the content of
presupposition triggered in the consequent: if the dependence
holds, and the speaker is highly cognitively loaded, then she
seems to be less disposed to select a conditional presupposition.
This effect of the cognitive load factor on the presupposition
selection in a dependent CpC might be explained by the bridging
inference that supports the dependence. The reason may be
that, under the Interference condition, participants had few
cognitive resources for performing the main task, given that
part of their cognitive resources were used in the second
task (i.e., memorizing geometrical figures). Since processing the
dependent conditional implied computing the bridging inference
(e.g., computing that “If Paul is a devout Catholic, then he will
read his Bible tonight” implies computing the bridging inference
“If someone is a devout Catholic, then he or she usually has a
10One relevant point concerns the reasons why the conditional presupposition
is more costly than the unconditional and whether Result 3A says something
about the satisfaction vs. DRT-like theories. However, data collected do not seem
to be strong enough for making previsions concerning the possible mechanisms
underlying the processing of conditional and unconditional presuppositions that
might be conjoined with different theories of presuppositions. Rather, data
collected by this experimental design allows the recognition simply of the cognitive
amount of selecting presuppositions in CpC: selecting conditional presuppositions
seems to be more cognitively demanding than selecting unconditional ones.
Further experimental studies should be conducted to investigate the link between
processing conditional and unconditional presuppositions in CpC and the
mechanisms employed in the competing theories.
Bible”), the interference of the second task under the Interference
condition affected the selection of the dependent conditional
presuppositions. The reason seems to be that the remaining
resources for performing the main task were not sufficient for
computing both the content of the conditional presuppositions
and the bridging inferences, with participants consequently
selecting less dependent conditional presuppositions under the
Interference condition than in the Simple condition. Conversely,
processing independent conditionals does not require computing
any bridging inference; hence, under the Interference condition,
the remaining resources for performing the main task were
sufficient for selecting the conditional presuppositions, meaning
that, under the Interference condition, participants selected
independent conditional presuppositions as often as under the
Simple.
To conclude, data collected support the idea that two relevant
factors affecting presupposition selection in the Proviso Problem
are (i) dependence between the antecedent of a CpC and the
presupposition triggered in the consequent and (ii) speakers’
cognitive load.
While presuppositions have, for a long time, been rather
unexplored as a topic in the field of experimental pragmatics, in
the last years, a new wave of studies (Schwarz, 2014; Domaneschi,
2015) have suggested that, while presuppositions are typically
considered background meanings, expected to be processed
automatically, the actual processing seems to involve a large
chunk of the cognitive resources available to the language
users, which affects the understanding of different kinds of
presuppositions.
It was expected that different factors would affect the
cognitive demand of processing a presupposition. This paper
has attempted to show that compositionality (i.e., conditional vs.
unconditional presuppositions) is one of these crucial factors.
SOME FINAL REMARKS CONCERNING
THE COGNITIVE LOAD FACTOR
Cognitive context, the set of presuppositions assumed to
be taken for granted by the participants in a conversation,
has been widely discussed since the debate on informative
presupposition (Gauker, 1998, 2008; Stalnaker, 1998, 2002; von
Fintel, 2008) and the distinction between passive and active (or
local) context (Kripke, 2009; Schlenker, 2009, 2011). On this
background, the notion of cognitive context (and of contextual
felicity) is still a working theoretical notion at the boundary
between semantics and pragmatics and is useful for treating
the pragmatic phenomenon of accommodation (von Fintel,
2008; Tonhauser et al., 2013). However, while the relevance of
different cognitive loads on processing conditionals is a usual
topic in psychological discussion, linguistic and philosophical
theories of presuppositions have usually bypassed the problem.
However, doing so runs the risk of treating the concept of
cognitive context (perhaps including the distinction between
passive and active context discussed by Kripke, 2009) without
considering that which context is shared—which presuppositions
are activated—may depend on the kind of cognitive effort
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required in a conversation. Without taking into account the
impact of the cognitive effort behind selecting certain linguistic
content in a context (e.g., presuppositions), we might overlook
or misunderstand some experiments’ results and, consequently,
be unable to select the right competing theory.
One of the problems with theories of communication based
on classical linguistic and philosophical theories is that they
sometimes depend on hypotheses concerning how hearers
should react or what they should understand to have been
discussedwithout taking into account different possible scenarios
arising from hearers’ different cognitive loads. In a previous
work (Domaneschi et al., 2014), we have discussed the role
of cognitive effort in detecting presuppositions, showing that
some presuppositions (mainly Iteratives and Change of State
Verbs, which deal with temporal features) are more difficult to
process when a hearer is highly cognitively loaded. The present
study, plus Domaneschi et al. (2014) give some provisional
methodological suggestions concerning the impact of the role
of cognitive load in assessing the plausibility of linguistic and
philosophical models: (i) the analysis of the cognitive load factor
might reveal that, even if a certain semantic reading of a sentence
appears to be like the default, that is, the one determined by
the meaning of the clause, language users can opt for a less
probable reading that is nevertheless more compatible with their
available cognitive resources. Missing this point may affect how
the different hypotheses under examination are assessed. (ii)
The cognitive context (the set of presuppositions) might change
depending not only on the logic of the discourse structure but
also on the speakers’ cognitive state, namely, the level of cognitive
load of participants in the conversation, which affects what
kind of presuppositions are selected and, consequently, how the
context changes in the course of a conversational exchange. These
considerations we propose as hints for future research that might
reveal further unexpected results.
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